



MARATHON

RESOURCE ADVISORS



“There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.”

– Vladimir Ilyich Lenin


tags: lenin, marx, revolution

It has been our long-held and consistently communicated belief that most raw materials markets were destined to reach points of critical supply shortage over the next 1-3 years based on underinvestment in productive capacity over the last decade. This was readily apparent in late 2021 and early 2022 as oil inventories declined, grain stockpiles shrank, and European natural gas prices skyrocketed. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting disruption across energy, metals and agriculture markets not only brought forward those points of supply pinches but made the world acutely aware of their effect on inflation, supply chains and national security.

Agriculture: From Tightness to Crisis


In our Q3 and Q4 2021 quarterly updates, we noted the acute shortages developing in the agricultural markets with declining grain inventories

becoming exacerbated by high European natural gas prices constraining nitrogen fertilizer output. As predicted, this dynamic persisted into Q1 2022 as both crop and nutrient prices rallied into mid-February, and food price increases began to impact consumer pocketbooks, ultimately infiltrating the CPI. When Russia first invaded Ukraine, most of the immediate concern was centered around the impact on energy; however, it was very clear to us that the largest and most systemically profound consequences would be in agriculture.



Russia and Ukraine are amongst the world's largest exporters of grains, cooking oils and fertilizers; therefore, the disruption of output has weighty repercussions on the global food system. It is our belief that these impacts have been become embedded in the sector for at least the next 1-2 years as high fertilizer prices result in lower nutrient application, driving yields down and forward grain inventories lower. This should support higher grain prices at the same time the supply side of the market is being constrained by both

decreased Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus production as well as a series of unrelated but compounding developments around the world. Harvests in Canada, Argentina, India, Pakistan, Morocco, and the U.S. have come in below expectations, and when one adds the severe damage to the export infrastructure in Odessa and around Ukraine, it means that even a quick resolution of that conflict would not alleviate the bottlenecks. A clear illustration of this would be significantly lower crop yields in South America next year driven by an inability to source Russian potash today. It remains our belief that a sustained elevated grain price environment will be highly supportive of fertilizer profitability over the next several years, and those producers with access to relatively lower cost natural gas should remain the best positioned.




The impact and severity of these dynamics will vary on a global basis, and developed economies should brace for continued higher prices and intermittent shortages. The rest of the world faces a much more dire predicament as availability of basic foodstuffs and cooking oils will be increasingly jeopardized.

The natural reaction to this would be hoarding and protectionism, both of which are beginning to occur around the world. Argentina, India, Serbia, Hungary, Egypt, and Bulgaria have all recently banned grain and other food exports, and proactive nations are already rationing supplies in anticipation of imminent shortages. The simultaneous and reinforcing surge in food and fuel costs will inevitably be highly destabilizing, and we suspect (and fear) that the populist repercussions will reshape the political map in ways that few can anticipate today.

Energy Market Structure: The Shortage Shifts from Crude to Products

The idea that global oil demand would not only recover but ultimately surpass pre-Covid levels was, until very recently, utterly unthinkable to most investors. And yet, just two short years later, we find ourselves back to north of 100 million barrels per day. To satisfy the increase, the scramble to re-start global energy development is now underway. While erratic behavior from western politicians has done little to help the cause, we suspect the world will find a way to effectively re-balance the markets as this is the nature of commodity cycles. It may well take a global economic slowdown/recession but for the moment, supply challenges in the form of negligible growth in global production despite accelerating spending as well as consistent OPEC under-production (even though there is every economic incentive to do the opposite) has kept the market in deficit. Government subsidies and price controls are not helping as masking price signals only encourages demand at a time when we desperately need it to moderate in order to prevent shortages. Further complicating matters is the likely deterioration of Russian production from export bans, deferred maintenance, parts shortages, and geologic complications from shutting in wells. With many experts noting a potential impact of 1-2 million barrels of supply/day over the balance of the year, that alone may be enough to offset any decline in demand from economic weakness. Ultimately, the tale being told by current inventory trends (where all supply and demand factors intersect) remains constructive.

US Oil and Products Storage Relentless Decline Continues




Source: HFI Research, IEA

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One part of the energy complex where capacity remains well below pre-Covid levels is the refining sector, where net plant closures over the last 3 years have removed 4 million barrels per day, or almost 4% of global output. This is understandable, as turning crude oil into gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and other products has always been a complicated, messy, volatile, and impossible-to-permit-a-new-one-anywhere-in-the-western-world subsector that was never expected to recover to prior levels of throughput anyway. As well, many of the existing marginal plants were re-tooled to produce biofuels, typically at significantly reduced capacity. As global demand has recovered, the real pinch

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


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
point has not been the amount of oil, but the ability to turn it into useable products. As with most things in the commodity world, this was exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine as idling Russian refineries no longer supplied Western Europe with product. The resulting drawdown in the global product slate has left consumers scrambling with rising mobility meeting diminishing supply.



The reduction in refining capacity is currently being felt most acutely in the diesel market, the workhorse fuel for the global economy. Stockpiles in NY harbor have reached the lowest level in 32 years, and shortage warnings in the long-haul trucker market are starting to proliferate. If one looks at it on a per-barrel basis, the cost of oil is up by about \$25 year-to-date, whereas the cost of diesel fuel is up over \$100! While the politicians will do their best to blame this on "price-gouging profiteers," the truth is, like most resource industries, the refining sector has been brutally de-capitalized by both government policies and challenging economics over the last decade. We reap what we sow.

Tight Supplies Driving Record Prices

NY Harbor Ultra-Low Sulphur Diesel



Source: CME and Bloomberg


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As the refinery industry struggles to keep up with even typically depressed winter demand, the U.S. is about to enter the summer driving season to strain it even further. It remains highly likely that product shortages will accelerate over the coming months, propelling prices higher until they reach a point where demand is curtailed. Should politicians decide to intervene with further subsidies or (heaven forbid) price caps, we can expect severe or potentially catastrophic market dislocations. As such, we are very positive on the refining sector and believe most investors have significantly underestimated its profitability over the coming quarters.

The "Green Revolution" Narrative Meets Reality

Over the course of Q1 we released several videos on the topics of the energy transition and the raw materials ramifications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In the first, we discussed the "selective" accounting used to claim wind and solar cost competitiveness with traditional hydrocarbons, and the implementation of green policies falling well short of these expectations. In the second, we detailed the deterioration of Europe's energy grid into an exorbitantly expensive, dysfunctional patchwork of redundant yet still unreliable systems that left it wholly reliant on a geopolitical adversary with very different objectives from its own. The true irony is that despite all the financial hardship it inflicted on its citizenry, Europe has been less successful than the U.S. in reducing carbon emissions. At the same time, the "Green Transition" armed Vladimir Putin with an exceptionally potent weapon with which to enforce his will across the continent. And yet, on April 22nd U.S. Climate Czar John Kerry proclaimed that Europe is the "Lead on the Planet" for "Energy Success." If this is success, we have a hard time imagining what failure looks like.

Raw Materials for EVs Skyrocketing Battery Electric (BEV) vs. Internal Combustion (ICE) Cars




Source: BofA Global Research estimates, Bloomberg; NCM811 is a type of battery using an 8:1:1 ratio of nickel, cobalt and manganese. We assume a battery size of c70kWh and an NCM 811 chemistry.
ICE= internal combustion engine; BEV= battery electric vehicle

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While the political and public call for accelerated renewables adoption remains highly popular, the realities of physical constraints in critical metals and materials are making their presence quite clear. Skyrocketing prices for polysilicon, nickel, lithium, and other materials have roundly silenced the “renewables will always fall in price” narrative. Evidence continues to pile up as solar farm cost overruns, massive surcharges for batteries in EVs and substantial increases in the cost of steel and rare earth metals for wind farms all conspire to raise costs despite Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) promises that they would always fall. The real issues are yet to come as raw material

constraints and inventory lags suggest the spike in input prices will continue to intensify for months, if not years. In fact, as shown in the chart below, the inputs required to realize the grandiose political promises of politicians may not be available at any price.



Yet another issue chipping away at renewables growth is the recent anti-dumping investigation by the U.S. Department of Commerce, which has taken the stance that many of the solar panels sold by Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand are actually manufactured and sold below cost by China. This action threatens at least 318 solar and battery storage projects over the next several years totaling over 50GW and \$50 Billion in private investment. It appears to be slowly dawning on governments around the world that, while sunlight and wind are indeed free, the materials and components that enable the capture of their energy are decidedly not. Additionally, we suspect the geopolitical ramifications of trading a modest reliance on the Middle East for traditional hydrocarbons for an overwhelming reliance on China for the


production, processing and key components used in wind and solar will become a topic of conversation.

Resource Valuations - Off the Mat, But Just Barely

The first quarter of 2021 was one of the best quarters of resource equities outperformance over the broader markets in history. So stark has that outperformance been, in fact, that between calls for an economic slowdown/recession and the "inflation has peaked" commentary, many are saying "too far, too fast" and calling for a rotation back into growth and financial assets. While the speed of the move has been rather breathtaking, we think those calling for an end to resource equity outperformance should "zoom out" a bit and look at some history.

In our January 2021 Macro Outlook, we outlined a relative performance and valuation framework that led us to the conclusion that **resource equities could rally by several hundred percent and still find themselves at the lowest end of nearly a 100-year valuation range**. Turns out that was just about right. According to the invaluable work from Grantham, Mayo Van Otterloo, as of the end of Q1'22 the valuation of Energy and Metals companies had recovered from its Covid-spike/ESG lows and now sits at the same levels as the late 1990s and 2014, which marked the two lowest points since 1926. In other words, after falling off the bed, through the floor and into the basement, the sector now, after a furious rally, has managed to find itself all the way back to the floor. Impressive, but we think it remains premature to call it "over."


Valuation of Energy/Metals Companies Relative to S&P 500



One of the major drivers of those valuations is, of course, commodity prices themselves. In a vein like the one above, many are also citing the recent rise in energy and metals prices over the last year and proclaiming us either late in, or at the end of, that move as well. Once again, we go to the historical record and feel comfortable in our position that recent moves in commodity prices, while appearing extreme to those who have seen them do little besides decline versus financial assets for most of the last 15 years, represent a very modest retracement of brutally oversold levels reached in 2020. In fact, the current level of what we term physical assets versus financial assets, after the admittedly massive move over the last year, still leaves us in the lowest 4% of valuation ranges over the last 50+ years, and effectively at the lows if one excludes the Covid beatdown.

Commodity Turn Appears Underway, but Early

GSCI Commodity/S&P 500 ratio




Source: Andreas Steno & Macrobond

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It is worth noting that the rally in resource equities from the Covid trough through the end of 2021 was little more than keeping pace with a powerfully rebounding equity market. Hard asset equity outperformance is less than a quarter or two old. The chart above shows 50+ years of this financial asset (S&P 500) versus physical asset (Commodities) cycle and illustrates how early in this reversal we are. As one looks at both the cycles in resource company valuations as well as the relationship of financial and physical assets, we think it worth noting that real "moves" in this sector last at least a decade, if not longer.

These cycles typically extend as long as they do given the considerable time, capital and confidence required to build up excess capacity. In prior

commodity price peaks, producers experienced multiple years of strong prices that gave them time to both identify the assets necessary to grow as well as embolden their investors and creditors to fund them. The vast majority of raw materials projects (with perhaps U.S. shale being the sole exception) historically require at least 5 years to move from discovery to production. In recent years, however, this has extended to at least a decade or more as a combination of increasingly remote and complicated deposits as well as extended permitting and regulatory cycles have further hampered the already challenging process.



The true measure of the timing of the current resource cycle lies in the level of capital that is being allocated to the sector. It is precisely this expansionary capital that will eventually result in breaking it. By that yardstick, we continue to feel quite comfortable that the current iteration remains in the toddler phase. We have frequently shown the 60%+ decline in capital expenditures since 2015 by the global mega-cap companies that make up the S&P Global Natural Resource Index. For a change of pace, we revisit above a chart we shared a year ago that looked at the portion of total S&P 500 capital expenditures incurred by resources versus the technology sector. The chart clearly suggests that it pays to invest countercyclically during periods of relatively low corporate cap-ex. Since we highlighted this in Q2 2021, technology spending has remained elevated and resource spending depressed. The obvious message to us is that our focus on commodity equities remains significantly more attractive than innovation and technology stocks that have garnered the majority of investment flows for the better part of the last fifteen years.

We also see little evidence that the broader investing public is returning to resource equities. In fact, more net inflows have tried to catch the falling knife of the poster child of non-profitable technology stocks (ARKK) over the last 30 days than have flowed into the three largest commodity equity ETFs (XLE, XME and XOP) combined all year! With investors still chasing “innovation” and ignoring commodities, we remain convinced markets are in the early stages of a prolonged resource cycle and continue to feel comfortable that this one is unlikely to be ending after just a single quarter of outperformance.

Inflation and the Global Economy

For the better part of a year, market expectations have been for inflation to peak and roll over. While base effects are indeed substantial and will begin to decelerate, we continue to see several significant components of the inflation equation that we originally highlighted in our Q3 2021 update pressuring the overall CPI to remain elevated.

- Energy - as noted above, while the oil price has not done much over the last couple of months, product prices such as diesel and jet fuel have risen substantially over that same time frame. Not only do those prices drive a primary impact but the real effects are secondary and tertiary as everything that moves starts to incorporate the rise in expense. We are hearing about widespread "fuel surcharges" being added to final goods sales, which have not even begun to be incorporated into CPI but should be felt over the next 3-6 months.
- Rents - across the country, rents are skyrocketing; however, as previously noted in prior updates, the impact on government statistics historically lags by as much as 6-9 months. Shelter makes up 25% of the CPI, and we expect 100-200bps of upward pressure from this measure alone over the balance of 2022.
- Food & Agriculture - the continued rise in grain and fertilizer prices over the last several months is only beginning to be incorporated into inflation statistics. The cereal you are eating today was likely made from grain that was produced a year ago or more, dried and stored for many months before being processed into a final product. The end ramifications of the higher prices we see today, a byproduct of conflict-driven shortages, poor harvests, and rising resource protectionism, will not begin to be incorporated into many final products for 6-12 months. Rising fertilizer and other production costs will also impart an upward bias.
- Labor markets continue to remain quite tight, and it appears that the visceral impact of real-world inflation is emboldening workers to negotiate for higher wages in a way that we have not seen in at least a generation. Unionization is on the rise, and even where it is not present, wages are adjusting upwards, often as a response to the long-utilized stock-based compensation losing some of its luster.
- The Russia/Ukraine conflict and the Chinese lockdown are accelerating the re-shoring of supply chains which have been in motion for the last several years. As we have noted on several occasions, replacing lowest cost manufacturing and supply chains with anything else is by definition inflationary. As security of supply and redundancy take their place, the impact will be higher finished goods prices for the foreseeable future.

There is an increasing body of evidence that leads us to believe that both the U.S. and global economy are slowing, and the combination of decelerating demand and high base effects will lead to moderating monthly inflation statistics as we move into the second half of the year. That said, we believe that those looking for a significant decline in commodity prices are using an outdated analog.

Previous occurrences of commodity crashes during economic slowdowns (1998, 2008) were during periods of time when excess commodity supplies had been built up over years of elevated capital spending. As we illustrated above, the opposite is true today, and the crippling decline in resource spending over the last decade offers no such catalyst to contribute to crashing prices. In fact, with most commodity markets increasingly in deficit despite inflationary pressures, a clear European slowdown, and a complete lockdown of the Chinese commodity consuming machine, it remains our belief that raw materials markets remain in the best position in recent memory to weather a slowdown in demand.

Naughty Nickel, Trucker Theater, Fleeting Foreign Exchange Reserves, the Evolving Monetary System and the Role of Physical Assets

For the better part of the last 40 years, the biggest and most unshakeable bull market has been the trust in financialization of assets. Individuals, companies and even countries themselves have moved past the need to hold things directly and put their faith in an increasingly complex global network of financial intermediaries to hold them on their behalf. For the last 40 years the “Global Order,” as described by Peter Zeihan in his global geopolitical masterpiece *Disunited Nations*, had an omnipotent U.S. enforcing the free flow of goods and capital around the world efficiently and safely, which engendered

a high degree of trust that those goods and that capital would go where they were supposed to. In return, countries, companies, and individuals felt comfortable holding their proceeds in U.S. Dollars, assumed their real estate, cash and other financial assets were secure, and that global equity, debt and commodity markets would always function in a fair and equitable way. Until recently, those seemed to be reasonable notions.

In January 2022, a movement began in response to vaccine mandates for truckers trying to cross the US-Canada border. The protests that ensued evolved into a much larger event, effectively blockading the border and immobilizing Canada's capital city of Ottawa by tens of thousands of workers exhausted from 18 months of Covid restrictions of all kinds. Money was crowdsourced from around the world in support of the effort, and over \$10M was set to be distributed until, under severe pressure, the financial intermediaries (GoFundMe and others) froze the proceeds. Weeks of political wrangling ensued with Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, invoking the country's "Emergencies Act" and threatening not only the protesters themselves but anyone who supported them with severe financial repercussions for doing so. On February 19th, with a Superior Court of Justice court order in hand, over 76 bank accounts for those related to the protests were frozen, many of which for no other reason than their financial support of the participants. The message was clear: government was redefining its ability to punish those who disagreed with it. While not new in the sphere of global dictatorships, this was new territory for the democratized west.

In March 2022, as many were concerned about the availability of nickel due to the large Russian market share, the price on the London Metals Exchange (LME) began to spike. Hundreds of millions of dollars were made by one side and lost by another, at which point the markets were halted, which has been known to happen from time to time. But then something unprecedented occurred. The LME cancelled thousands of prior transactions, invalidating profits (and losses) that had accrued to various parties, and the exchange subsequently struggled for weeks trying to re-open a market that hadn't ceased to function in such a way in generations. Market participants who had every reason to believe that they had crystalized tremendous profits were effectively told that those on the losing side of the trade, amongst them many

of the largest members of the LME, would get a “do-over.” The unmistakable message from this is that the exchanges were redefining their obligations to their various constituencies, shattering the trust in fair and equitable markets.

Around the same time as the nickel fiasco, the United States and many of its western allies were formulating a financial response to the invasion of Ukraine. Along with the usual tools of sanctions and embargos, the west also decided to seize the assets of dozens of Russian nationals as well as confiscate all the internationally held foreign exchange reserves of the Russian government, the latter to the tune of roughly \$300 billion. This was done with no legal process in either the U.S. or international courts. Moral judgements aside, the seizing of this scale of assets without any legal consideration, not just from individuals but from a G-7 government and nuclear-armed superpower, is both unprecedented and, in our opinion, a really big deal. From Russia’s point of view, the proceeds from many years of selling its domestic goods to the rest of the world were unilaterally stripped without any measure of due process. The message here is clear as well: under certain circumstances property rights in the west are no longer subject to the rule of law, and those circumstances will be determined by a short list of politicians untethered by any conventional legal considerations. Below we have paraphrased the comments of Louis-Vincent Gave on this topic during his recent Macro Voices podcast appearance, more eloquently and concisely than we could hope to do ourselves:

The greatest comparative advantage of the western world is the rule of law and the property rights that derive from that...the reason that Saudi princes, Chinese tycoons, and Russian oligarchs buy property in New York or London, or Vancouver is not because they expect better returns, but because they are “safety” assets that they will have access to if things go badly at home. Similarly, foreign countries around the world for the last generation have, without hesitation, held the proceeds of months, years and even decades of selling their goods around the world in western financial institutions and denominated in US dollars. If we can unilaterally, quickly and with no court process simply take the property of those associated with actions or ideals that we don’t believe with (in this case the invasion of Ukraine), what keeps us from doing so with any Chinese asset should they invade Taiwan? Or any Middle Eastern government we deem to be contributing to climate change? Or,

indeed, any social media company whose products we judge to be adversely impacting the mental health of our citizens?

The current monetary evolution is about even more than just the end of trust in financialization as highlighted above. For the last 30 years, through the Dotcom Bust, the Global Financial Crisis and Covid Response, markets have come to believe that politicians and central bank policy makers have the ability, through the various tools at their disposal, to deftly manage the global economy in a narrow range of outcomes that are generally beneficial to asset prices. It is our belief that this complacency is about to be severely tested, as the heretofore “go-to” response of easing financial conditions is newly constrained by the reemergence of significant inflation pressures. It is also our belief that the removal of their primary tool (crutch?) will ultimately lead to much higher variability of economic outcomes, with the resultant volatility adversely impacting financial asset values in general and, in particular, those that have benefitted most from a higher degree of speculation and/or leverage.

Bringing this full circle, it appears to us that a multi-faceted regime change is at hand. From one direction we have the fracturing trust in financialization, and the questionable claims individuals, countries and nations believe they have that has defined the post-cold war era. From a slightly different vector, cracks are beginning to appear in the omnipotence of governments and central banks’ ability to simultaneously keep the economy, inflation, and employment under control. While we are likely to be accused of bias (for obvious reasons), our belief is that these trends are both supportive of unleveraged physically held assets as opposed to leveraged financially held ones.


The fact that all of this is occurring during a period of self-inflicted commodity scarcity is not happenstance. The bull market in financial assets and central bank suppression of interest rates was key to funding the commodity supply glut of the mid-2010s, which resulted in a bust across the energy and metals markets, and reinforced the belief that deflation would always prevail. This justified ever-rising multiples on, and speculation in, those same financial assets. That speculation led to the rise of the ultimate manifestation of financialization, “digital” asset claims, that syphoned off significant investment capital that would normally have flowed to historical physical stores of value.

The blanket of complacency offered by ever-expanding global wealth in many ways also enabled the rise of new objectives beyond traditional economic returns. The push for Green Energy, while generally well intentioned, was only made possible by the massive surpluses in the energy and materials markets which provide their physical inputs. Those surpluses have now all but vanished, as the effective demonization of traditional energy and materials via ESG mandates are not only strangling the very things necessary to go "Green" but also significantly raising the cost of the 80% of the global energy system still composed of traditional fossil fuels.

The result of all this, in our humble opinion, is a tectonic shift that favors the very companies we have spent the last several decades focusing on. Countries, companies, and individuals are rethinking the safety of financial assets, whose valuations even after recent modest declines remain amongst the loftiest ever recorded while physical assets remain profoundly inexpensive in comparison. At the same time, Central Bankers are struggling to walk a fine line between economic stability and inflation that virtually guarantees slips along the way. Should they fall on the side of recession or worse, those financial valuations are likely to crash further towards normality. A stumble to the side of inflation in a world of suppressed interest rates could lead to a scramble towards a depleted inventory of "stores of value," further spiraling commodity prices higher. And, regardless of which side they fall on, current shortages of various forms of food and fuel are triggering a series of resource protectionism and nationalism that will further disrupt the investment in, and flow of, those critical items.

Our case for investing in high free cash and income-generating natural resource equities has always been built on the cornerstone of their ability to navigate through, and thus capitalize on, the brutal cycles inherent to the commodity markets better than their cash consuming peers. A number of years ago we also reasoned that a looming shortage in resource capacity due to underinvestment was developing which would benefit the best positioned survivors. As well, these companies' ability to deliver truly "inflation protected" income during a period of zero interest rate policies and widespread negative real rates has seemed increasingly attractive. While it appears that a few investors have begun to take note of this, as we illustrated above, the

“tremendous outperformance” of resource stocks over the broader market is only a few short months old and has done little more than bring their relative valuations back to the lowest ever recorded outside of 2020-2021. As shown below, these cycles typically run for a decade, if not longer.



It appears to us that both our “de-financialization” and “economic volatility” cases outlined above have the potential to add substantial power and duration to this already attractive cyclical shift for resources. Since the last peak in physical assets more than 15 years ago, the global stack of financial assets has swelled by hundreds of trillions of dollars, the vast majority of which remain predominantly invested in historically expensive financial assets. In our view, it is becoming clear that much of that stack is now vulnerable to not only increasingly adverse government influence but also the potential of forced sale resulting from a still highly leveraged system built upon the expectation of low inflation and modest economic volatility in perpetuity.

History tells us that leverage and economic volatility are a bad combination, and global policymakers will be forced into some very challenging decisions as a result. This backdrop has the potential to be harsh across most asset classes, but we believe unlevered producers of necessary physical commodities, un beholden to financial markets for incremental capital will remain the best positioned to both protect and enhance wealth.

As always, many thanks for your interest and support.

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